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Caveating a Mortgagee Sale – The Need for a Uniform Approach 
Bill Dixon♣ 
The ability of a mortgagor to lodge a caveat, where an allegation is raised of serious 
impropriety by a mortgagee in exercising power of sale, may be a critical protective tool for a 
mortgagor.  The mortgagor’s capacity, as caveator, to lodge a caveat over the mortgagor’s 
own title and the nature of the interest necessary to support the caveat are contentious 
issues.  This article examines the different judicial approaches that have been adopted to 
date and states a case for a uniform approach to this issue across Australia in the future.  
Introduction 
Traditionally, caveat provisions across Australia have been used to afford protection 
to the holders of unregistered equitable interests.  However, cases involving mortgagee 
sales give rise to the question whether a mortgagor can use a caveat to prevent the 
completion of a mortgagee sale where serious impropriety is alleged on the part of the 
mortgagee such that any transfer by the mortgagee to a buyer may be voidable.  In this 
instance, the mortgagor is seeking to lodge a caveat over their own title purely as a 
preventative measure.  This departs from the traditional use of a caveat, whereby a caveat 
is lodged by the holder of an unregistered interest rather than the registered proprietor.  
Despite the protective value of a mortgagor’s ability to caveat their own title, the 
courts have not been consistent in their recognition of this ability.  The traditional approach 
has been to reject that the mortgagor has a caveatable interest.  However, growing discord 
across most Australian jurisdictions suggests support for a broader approach recognising 
that a mortgagor may caveat their own title in certain instances.  Although the cases 
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demonstrate a lingering hesitation as to the effect of the traditional approach, the growing 
recognition of a mortgagor’s right to caveat their own title, in appropriate circumstances, 
suggests that this should be reflected in a uniform approach throughout Australia.   
Swanston Mortgage Pty Ltd v Trepan Investments Pty Ltd1 (‘Swanston’) is the 
Victorian decision that has been most commonly cited as authority for the proposition that 
a mortgagor does not hold an interest sufficient to support a caveat.  This has been followed 
as the traditional approach of the courts both in Victoria and elsewhere.2  This authority is 
the key hurdle that a mortgagor faces when attempting to prevent a mortgagee sale by 
lodging a caveat.  The rationale for the decision is that a mortgagor alleging impropriety on 
the part of the mortgagee holds only a mere equity, which is insufficient to support a 
caveat.3  Under this traditional approach, the view that is adopted is that no equitable 
interest in the land arises from a mortgagor’s equity to set aside an improper or fraudulent 
exercise of the power of sale until such time as the equity is established in curial 
proceedings.4 
However, the alternative approach, which is more favourable towards mortgagors, 
has questioned the basis of this decision and preferred to recognise that a mortgagor’s 
interest when alleging serious impropriety by the mortgagee may be a sufficient caveatable 
interest.  In particular, the courts have taken care to distinguish the question of whether the 
mortgagor has a caveatable interest from that of how a priorities dispute should be 
                                                 
1 [1994] 1 VR 672. 
2 See, for example, Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Kyriackou [2003] VSC 175; Western Australian Real 
Estate Custodian Pty Ltd (Receiver and Manager Appointed) v Chesson [2005] WASC 33; Vasiliou v Westpac 
Banking Corporation [2007] VSC 113; (2007) 19 VR 229 (Court of Appeal). 
3 For a description of the four different senses in which the word ‘equity’ may be used with respect to interests, 
see Diane Skapinker, ‘Equitable Interests, Mere Equities, “Personal” Equities and “Personal Equities” – 
Distinction with a Difference’ (1994) 68 ALJ 593. 
4 Being the effect of Swanston as recently described in Wichniewicz v Registrar of Titles [2014] WASC 18. 
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resolved.5  These alternative positions must be considered in the context of the necessity 
that a mortgagor is able to caveat their own title and the other avenues that may be 
available. 
If a mortgagor can prevent the exercise of a power of sale by a mortgagee by an 
injunction before a purchaser enters into a contract of sale, the lodgement of a caveat might 
not be necessary.  If, on the other hand, the mortgagee has exercised power of sale, 
particularly in favour of a bona fide purchaser for value, and action is taken after the date of 
the contract, it may be necessary for a mortgagor to lodge a caveat to prevent dealings with 
the land pending the outcome of any proceedings to restore or redress the mortgagor’s 
rights.  The question is whether a mortgagor who may, or may not, have a right of action to 
have a contract set aside has a sufficient estate or interest in the mortgaged land to support 
a caveat.  It is on this point that the authorities diverge.   
In circumstances of a mortgagee sale, the ability of a mortgagor to caveat their own 
title is a particularly powerful weapon.  It is a time and cost-effective strategy to enable the 
mortgagor to protect their interest in the land where a mortgagee sale is imminent.  These 
factors are particularly salient in mortgagee sales cases, as a mortgagor’s options may be 
limited by the time in which they are able to intervene with the sale, especially where 
Torrens title is involved.  The cases have typically arisen where the power of sale has been 
exercised and a mortgagee has entered into a contract of sale, thus an intervening measure 
is necessary before a transfer is registered. 
Of course, the capacity of a mortgagor to intervene by way of a caveat also has 
significant implications for a mortgagee.  The mortgagee often has a vested interest in a 
timely sale and the possibility of losing a potential purchaser, or even encountering liability 
                                                 
5 In Schmidt v 28 Myola Street Pty Ltd and Myola Nominees Pty Ltd [2006] VSC 343 it was judicially noted that 
Swanston has been criticised for treating the questions of a caveatable interest and that of priority equivalently. 
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for being unable to complete the contract of sale, are consequences which must also be 
considered.  It is in consideration of both of these perspectives that the two distinct 
approaches to a mortgagor’s ability to caveat have arisen. 
The Difficulty – Contextual Background 
As alluded to previously, in practice there are two initial difficulties in establishing a 
mortgagor’s right to lodge a caveat.  The first is the fact that the mortgagor is still the 
registered proprietor and the question of whether or not a registered proprietor may lodge 
a caveat to protect that interest in the estate against action by the mortgagee.  Secondly, 
the question arises as to the true identity of the right of the mortgagor allegedly defrauded, 
being whether the mortgagor enjoys an equitable interest in the land6 or a ‘mere equity’ 
which might not support a caveat.7  This difference is placed in sharp relief where a 
mortgagee has entered into a contract of sale of the land, which has not been completed, at 
the time the caveat is lodged. 
The High Court, by majority, in Forsyth v Blundell8 held that, in circumstances such as 
these, the mortgagor was, at least, entitled to an injunction to prevent the completion of 
the contract.  Walsh J conceded in that case that the right of the mortgagor was not merely 
an equity of redemption but, until the (legal) title was transferred with the sale, the 
mortgagor retained a legal interest in the land and had a proprietary right to enforce such 
interests.9   
The nature of this right and the right to lodge a caveat, in very similar circumstances, 
arose in Sinclair v Hope Investments Pty Ltd,10 where a mortgagor had lodged a caveat while 
                                                 
6 Latec Investments Ltd v Hotel Terrigal Pty Ltd (in liq) (1965) 113 CLR 265 at 284.  
7 Ibid, 289 (Menzies J).  
8 (1973) 129 CLR 477.  
9 Ibid, 497 - 498.  
10 [1982] 2 NSWLR 870.  
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still remaining the registered proprietor.  Needham J considered that the question whether 
the registered proprietor may lodge a caveat before the completion of the contract is no 
different from the question whether, after the contract has been completed and the 
transfer lodged, the mortgagor may lodge a caveat to protect the right to have the sale set 
aside.11  In so deciding, Needham J equated the right to enforce an equitable claim with an 
equitable estate or interest in land and overcame the objection posed by the initial 
distinction postulated by the High Court in Latec Investments v Hotel Terrigal Pty Ltd (in 
liq)12 (‘Latec’).  
The further step, that of the validity of a caveat lodged after the contract had been 
completed, was considered in the Queensland decision of Re McKean’s Caveat.13  Here, a 
registered proprietor and mortgagor of land lodged a caveat after the completion of a sale 
of the land by a mortgagee in possession to a third party purchaser claiming a caveatable 
interest as registered proprietor in fee simple, in the anticipation of setting aside the 
contract of sale.  Ryan J held that the mortgagor of registered land was not precluded from 
asserting a caveatable interest in the land,14 after completion of the sale, and before 
registration of the transfer to the purchaser.  On the material before the court, Ryan J found 
that the balance of convenience indicated that the status quo should be preserved to enable 
the caveator to bring proceedings to have the contract of sale set aside, but only on the 
condition that the caveator brought an action to do so within a specified time at the risk of 
having the caveat removed.15 
  
                                                 
11 Ibid at 875.  
12 (1965) 113 CLR 265.  
13 [1988] 1 Qd R 524.  
14 Ibid at 526.  
15 Quaere whether a mortgagor in such circumstances seeking to prevent the registration of any dealing has gone 
further than any legitimate claim it might have to protect its rights; see Mir Bros Projects Pty Ltd v 1924 Pty Ltd 
[1980] 2 NSWLR 907 at 922. 
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The Traditional Approach 
It is fair to say that different views have been expressed on the right of a mortgagor 
to lodge a caveat to prevent a transfer from a mortgagee to a buyer from being registered.  
The traditional approach, grounded in the characterisation of equitable interests, was 
expressed in Swanston.  In this case, a mortgagee exercising power of sale, after two 
unsuccessful auctions, entered into a contract for the sale of the security for a price of $1.56 
million.  Shortly before this sale, suggestions had been made that two other companies may 
have been willing and able to buy the property for a price of $1.9 million or $2 million.  
These two companies were associated with a person who was an acquaintance of the 
controller of the mortgagor company.  That person (the controller) had given the mortgagee 
a guarantee of the performance of the mortgagor’s obligation and the suggested purchases 
for $1.9 million or $2 million were associated with suggestions that the mortgagee could 
release that person from liability.  
Two days after the sale by the mortgagee to a third party, the mortgagor lodged a 
caveat at the Titles Office seeking to prohibit the registration of any transfer by the 
mortgagee on the basis that the sale by the mortgagee was voidable as being in breach of 
the mortgagee’s duty to the mortgagor.  The mortgagor claimed an equitable interest which 
was based on the right of the mortgagor to have the sale set aside. 
Brooking J16 considered the position of the mortgagor who claimed an equity to have 
a sale set aside in these circumstances and that mortgagor’s right to caveat the affected 
land.  After an examination of the authorities above, Brooking J preferred not to follow 
Sinclair v Hope Investments Pty Ltd17 or Re McKean’s Caveat18 on the basis that the 
                                                 
16 With whom Southwell and Teague JJ agreed. 
17 [1982] 2 NSWLR 870.  
18 [1988] 1 Qd R 524. 
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equitable claim alleged did not amount to an equitable interest sufficient to support a 
caveat.  Rather, Brooking J applied the principle from the Queensland case of Re Pile’s 
Caveats,19 where a claim to have land re-transferred, on the basis that the original transfer 
had been procured by fraud, was characterised by Dunn J as a personal equity which could 
not support a caveat.  If anything, Brooking J agreed that the right to have the contract set 
aside went no further than a mere equity at the very most and as such could not support a 
caveat.20 
A Broader Approach 
Whilst Swanston represents a more traditional view of the nature of an equitable 
interest, it fails to take into account the broader approach generally being taken to 
caveatable interests in more recent times.  As mentioned, Brooking J applied the principle 
from a Queensland decision, Re Pile’s Caveats.21  However, the decision in Re Pile’s 
Caveats22 was not followed in the later Queensland cases of Re McKean’s Caveat23 and Re 
Cross and National Australia Bank Ltd24 and it has been very recently observed that the 
precedent value of Re Pile’s Caveats25 has now been substantially diminished.26 
More recent cases exemplify movement away from the traditional narrow view that 
an interest which may only be an equity to relief involving land will not give rise to a 
                                                 
19 [1981] Qd R 81.  
20 The Queensland decision of Re Cross and National Australia Bank Ltd (1992) Q Conv R ¶ 54 – 433, where a 
caveat had been lodged by a mortgagor after a mortgage has been rescinded for misrepresentation, was also 
disapproved by Brooking J. 
21 [1981] Qd R 81.  
22 Id.  
23 [1988] 1 Qd R 524. 
24 (1992) Q Conv R ¶ 54 – 433. 
25 [1981] Qd R 81.  
26 The diminished relevance of Re Pile’s Caveats [1981] Qd R 81 was referred to by Henry J in Re Brooks’ 
Caveat [2014] QSC 76 at [37]. 
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caveatable interest in that land.27  A broader approach was initially exhibited in dicta by 
Mason and Deane JJ in Legione v Hateley28 and has subsequently been endorsed and gained 
ascendancy29 with later decisions of the High Court such as Bahr v Nicolay (No 2)30 and Stern 
v McArthur.31 
This broader approach is exemplified by decisions such as Jessica Holdings Pty Ltd v 
Anglican Property Trust Diocese of Sydney32 and Re Henderson’s Caveat.33  These cases 
widened the circumstances in which the interest claimed in the relevant caveats were 
sustained when previously they would have been considered to amount to a mere equity 
only.  Admittedly, these cases related to the nature of an interest under a contract of sale 
which was subject to a condition requiring a local authority to give some consent or take 
some other step before the contract could be regarded as unconditional.  These types of 
contract had traditionally been treated as contracts which gave the purchaser a mere equity 
instead of an equitable interest until fulfilment of the condition.  
However, following the approach in these cases the availability of injunctive relief 
may provide a basis for the recognition of a mortgagor’s right to caveat.  In these cases, it 
was held that a purchaser’s interest may in fact be protected by injunctive relief (on the 
initial supposition that a caveat could not be lodged) and, thus, this was sufficient to 
warrant the broadening of the right to lodge a caveat.  As observed by Macrossan CJ and 
Demack J in Re Henderson’s Caveat:34 
                                                 
27 This shift away from the traditional narrow view is acknowledged by Henry J in Re Brooks’ Caveat [2014] 
QSC 76 referring with approval (at [37]) to MacDonald, McCrimmon, Wallace and Weir, Real Property Law in 
Queensland, 3rd ed, 392. 
28 (1983) 153 CLR 406 at 446. 
29 As noted by Malcolm CJ in Kuper v Keywest Constructions Pty Ltd (1990) 3 WAR 419 at 431. 
30 (1988) 164 CLR 604. 
31 (1988) 165 CLR 489. 
32 (1992) 27 NSWLR 140.  
33 [1998] 1 Qd R 632.  
34 [1998] 1 Qd R 632.  
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There is now weighty opinion in the High Court suggesting that an equitable interest in land can exist 
when a claimant is entitled to something less than a full decree of specific performance ordering 
conveyance, that is it can exist provided that a claimant is entitled to equitable relief by way of 
injunction or other remedy to maintain and protect his interest. … With an expanded view of what 
constitutes an equitable interest in land, a correspondingly wider view of a caveatable interest … can 
apply.35 
It is conceded that these cases are different in aspect from the facts constituted by 
Swanston where a mortgagor is seeking to set aside a sale entered into by a mortgagee who 
has entered into a contract of sale with a buyer in circumstances where equity may act to 
set such a sale aside.  That said, it is interesting to note that a mortgagor’s entitlement to an 
injunction was recognised in Forsyth v Blundell36 in factually similar circumstances to 
Swanston. 
Practical Advantage of a Broader Approach  
A number of practical advantages may be seen to flow from the adoption of this 
broader approach. 
As noted, in factual circumstances similar to Swanston, in Forsyth v Blundell37 the 
mortgagor was entitled to an injunction to prevent the completion of the contract between 
the mortgagee exercising power of sale and the buyer.38  It is useful to draw a comparative 
analogy from the entitlement to an injunction in such cases.  What difference is there 
between a mortgagor claiming an injunction to restrain the further performance of a 
contract so entered into, and the lodgement of a caveat to prevent a transfer from the 
mortgagee being registered?  In both instances, what is complained of is conduct which 
equity traditionally has found offensive.  The caveat is, after all, a statutory injunction and, 
                                                 
35 Ibid at 637-638. 
36 (1973) 129 CLR 477.  
37 (1973) 129 CLR 477. 
38 Ibid at 497 – 498.  
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in essence, the right to lodge and maintain a caveat should parallel the right to seek and 
maintain an injunction.39  
There is a second matter of the cost to the parties which indicates that caveats 
should be facilitated as a practical option to protect a mortgagor’s interest.  It is more costly 
for a mortgagor to apply to the court for an injunction and the same tests as to the balance 
of convenience would be applied in both cases.  There is a statutory right in all Torrens 
statutes to claim compensation against wrongful lodgement of a caveat40 and there is an 
equitable right to seek an undertaking as to damages where damage may be caused by the 
granting of an interim injunction which is later found to be legally unjustified in the 
circumstances.41 
Thirdly, there is the practicality of the situation.  A mortgagor who discovers 
equitable misconduct may only do so at the last minute after a sale has been completed and 
at the time of production of the transfer to the buyer for registration.  There are very few 
avenues open to such a mortgagor if that person is to protect the mortgaged property and 
maintain the status quo until a court determines whether or not that equitable misconduct 
warrants setting aside the transaction between the mortgagee exercising the power of sale 
and the buyer.  If such a person might successfully seek an injunction, with all the equitable 
safeguards necessary for its grant, there seems no reason why that person should not be 
able to take advantage of a caveat system which is far cheaper and more effective, and 
which requires for the caveat to be maintained for the caveator/mortgagor to commence 
                                                 
39 The underlying nature of a caveat being similar to an interlocutory injunction has been noted on many 
occasions.  A recent example is provided by Watts J in Allan & Allan (No 2) [2012] FamCA 932 at [85]. 
40 See, example, Land Title Act 1994 (Qld) s 130. 
41 The recent Victorian Court of Appeal decision in Love v Thwaites [2014] VSCA 25 provides a clear 
illustration of the stringency of the usual undertaking for damages given by a party who successfully obtains an 
interlocutory injunction. 
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proceedings promptly to have the appropriate transaction set aside, and notify these 
proceedings to the Registrar of Titles.42 
Finally, the stage of the transaction involving the mortgagee when the conduct 
complained of is discovered is also a relevant consideration.  Relatively few cases consider 
what course is to be taken if any impropriety of the mortgagee only comes into question 
once the transfer is lodged for registration.  If an injunction is successfully sought by the 
mortgagor to restrain the mortgagee from completing the contract, then no question of a 
caveat may arise.  If the alleged fraud is only revealed at a later time, after a transfer from a 
mortgagee exercising power of sale to a buyer has been lodged for registration, then a more 
difficult question arises as to how to prevent this from proceeding to registration.  
Obviously, a caveat at that stage is the surest remedy, but it raises the question as to 
whether or not an equitable interest, as opposed to a mere equity, can be asserted.  There 
seems no reason in logic or law why a mortgagor who only later discovers the equitable 
misconduct which may give rise to a right to have the sale set aside should be 
disadvantaged in this way. 
Support for a Broader Approach 
A number of recent decisions illustrate a growing tendency for the courts to prefer 
the broader approach described in this article.  Although still frequently cited, there is now 
greater reluctance being shown to follow the decision in Swanston.  While Swanston still 
commands respect,43 the decision has been the subject of increased criticism,44 including in 
Victoria, the state in which the case originated.  Apart from the other judicial developments 
                                                 
42 Transfer of Land Act 1958 (Vic), ss 89A and 90; Land Title Act 1994 (Qld), s 126; Real Property Act 1900 
(NSW), s 74I and 74J; Transfer of Land Act 1893 (WA), s 138; Real Property Act 1886 (SA), s 45 and Land 
Titles Act 1980 (Tas), s 136. 
43 As noted by White J in Stone v Leonardis [2011] SASC 153 at [46], a decision of an intermediate Court of 
Appeal in another State on a comparable legislative provision must command considerable respect.  
44 For earlier academic criticism, see, Wright, ‘Does the Registered Proprietor Have a Caveatable Interest?’ 
[1995] 69 ALJ 935.  
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in the area which were disapproved of in Swanston, the decision also fails to take account of 
the widening of the concept of ‘equitable interests’ generally, as well as the practicality of 
the situation of the mortgagor, as discussed above. 
These subsequent decisions have criticised Brooking J’s treatment of the authorities 
at the time of the decision and have, in turn, declined to follow the decision.  Nevertheless, 
despite this tendency to decline to follow Swanston, its continued consideration suggests 
that the decision still causes some hesitation in the courts.  The increasingly negative 
treatment of the decision across a number of Australian jurisdictions (as illustrated below) 
demonstrates the need for a uniform approach which finally dispenses with the Swanston 
reasoning once and for all. 
New South Wales 
In a case with virtually identical facts,45 the Supreme Court of New South Wales 
dismissed the Swanston reasoning in Capital Finance Australia Ltd v Bayblu Holdings Pty 
Ltd.46  Pembroke J declared the reasoning of Brooking J in Swanston was ’clearly wrong’,47 
preferring to follow the decision in Sinclair v Hope Investments.48  Pembroke J commented 
that the court was not bound to follow Swanston, highlighting a recurring issue with the 
weight given to the decision.   
Swanston is a decision from the Victorian Court of Appeal which, although not 
strictly binding on interstate courts, is nevertheless highly persuasive in terms of precedent.  
For New South Wales, Pembroke J has taken the necessary steps in finally departing from 
                                                 
45 As noted by David Richardson and Anthony Lo Surdo, ‘In Brief: Capital Finance Australia Ltd v Bayblu 
Holdings Pty Ltd [2011] NSWSC 24’ (2011) 26(9) Australian Banking Law Bulletin 149. 
46 [2011] NSWSC 24.  
47 Ibid at [24]. 
48 [1982] 2 NSWLR 870. 
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the decision by rejecting it as clearly wrong.  This is a powerful demonstration of the 
unsatisfactory nature of the Swanston approach. 
Tasmania  
In Patmore v Upton49 the Supreme Court of Tasmania delivered one of the earliest 
judgments which did not treat Swanston favourably.  The court supported Swanston in so 
far as more than a fee simple interest as registered proprietor is necessary to support a 
caveat.50  However, Upton J did not support the notion that a mortgagor is precluded from 
holding a caveatable interest.  In particular, the court was critical of Brooking J’s 
consideration of Latec when determining whether the mortgagor had a caveatable interest.  
The court took care to distinguish the questions of caveatable interest and priority and 
observed: 
there is no warrant for assuming that in the case of a voidable conveyance the mortgagor’s equity 
will be classified in the same way as the court classifies that equity in a priority dispute.51 
Further, Underwood J reached the following conclusion:  
I have respectfully come to the conclusion that insofar as Swanston is authority for the proposition that 
the equitable interest of a mortgagor in the case of a voidable sale by a mortgagee, yet to be 
completed, is insufficient to create an equitable interest in land, it should not be followed.  Until the 
contract is completed there is no conveyance to set aside and thus no impediment to the mortgagor 
asserting an equity of redemption.52  
Queensland 
As previously mentioned, the clear trend for Queensland has been to follow the 
reasoning in Sinclair v Hope Investments.53  As noted, Ryan J in Re McKean’s Caveat54 upheld 
                                                 
49 [2004] TASSC 77.  
50 Ibid at [58]. 
51 Ibid at [55]. 
52 Ibid at [61].  
53 [1982] 2 NSWLR 870. 
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the broader view of the interest required to sustain a caveat.  This view was endorsed, in 
dictum, by Pincus J in Andel Pty Ltd v Century Car Care Pty Ltd.55  In the absence of any 
discussion, this view also seems to have been implicitly accepted in Benzlaw & Associates 
Pty Ltd v Medi-Aid Centre Foundation Ltd,56 where White J accepted that the balance of 
convenience favoured that a caveat, claiming the mortgagee’s exercise of the power of sale 
was improper, should remain, notwithstanding that the caveat was not lodged until after 
the completion of the mortgagee sale.  
South Australia 
A number of South Australian decisions have questioned the Swanston precedent.  
In Jacem Pty Ltd v RMBL Investments Ltd57 (‘Jacem’) it was held that there is no impediment 
to the plaintiff lodging a caveat over its own land, but before it can do so it must have an 
equitable interest.  However, the most definitive disapproval was given by White J in Stone v 
Leonardis58 (‘Stone’), where the previous criticisms of Swanston (including those in Jacem) 
were upheld and the court concluded that the reasoning in Swanston was clearly wrong.   
The case provides a detailed consideration of the authorities before reaching this 
conclusion and clearly illustrates the court grappling with the status to be given to the 
Swanston decision.  In particular, White J commented that the decision of an intermediate 
Court of Appeal in another jurisdiction commands ‘considerable respect.’59  However, 
ultimately it was concluded in both Jacem and Stone that an interest arising from a right to 
prevent a mortgagee sale may be a sufficient interest to support a caveat.  
  
                                                                                                                                                        
54 [1988] 1 Qd R 524.  
55 (1989) Q Conv R ¶54-315.  
56 [2006] QSC 57.  
57 [2010] SADC 97.  
58 [2011] SASC 153.  
59 Ibid at [46]. 
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Western Australia 
Swanston has been considered on several occasions by the Supreme Court of 
Western Australia.  In McCourt v National Australia Bank Ltd,60 Murphy J ultimately 
concluded that the issue did not need to be determined.  However, Swanston was not 
treated favourably by Murphy J and the tone of the judgment suggests that it would not 
have been followed.61  Similarly, in Westpac Banking Corporation v Murray Riverside Pty 
Ltd,62 Beech J referred to the differing views that have been expressed as to whether a 
registered proprietor can lodge a caveat but was not required to resolve the question 
However, clearer guidance is provided by a very recent decision of the Western 
Australian Supreme Court where the Swanston approach was viewed with disapproval.  In 
Wichniewicz v Registrar of Titles,63 Edelman J makes the observation that Swanston takes an 
overly literal approach to ‘interest in land.’64  On this basis, the court preferred to follow the 
broader authority and hold that a mortgagor may have an interest capable of protection by 
a caveat. 
Victoria 
As a matter of precedent, the Swanston approach was followed in a string of older 
Victorian cases.65  However, criticism has emerged in more recent decisions.  Swanston was 
considered by the Victorian Supreme Court in Schmidt v 28 Myola Street66 where it seems 
that care was taken to distinguish the facts and the law under consideration from Swanston 
                                                 
60 [2010] WASC 121.  
61 Murphy J notes (at [11]) the criticism of the Swanston decision. 
62 [2013] WASC 433. 
63 [2014] WASC 18.  
64 Ibid at [13]. 
65 Whidbourne Nominees Pty Ltd v Trephine Investments Pty Ltd (1994) V ConvR 54-496; Commonwealth Bank 
of Australia v Maxwell Norman Diprose and Registrar of Titles [1995] VSC 116; Renwari Pty Ltd v Birky 
(1998) V ConvR 54-578; Law Mortgagees Queensland Pty Ltd v Thirteenth Corp Pty Ltd [1999] VSC 360; 
Walter v Registrar of Titles [2003] VSCA 122. 
66 [2006] VSC 343.  
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so as to avoid following the decision.  The court noted the criticism of Swanston and 
commented that Latec was actually distinguishable from the circumstances in Swanston, 
implying that the outcome may not have been duly justified.  Although the court ultimately 
did not need to determine whether it was bound by Swanston, the negative tone of the 
judgment suggests that it was reluctant to follow the decision.  Although the circumstances 
in this case were factually distinct from Swanston, the fact that the court went beyond this 
to consider the criticism of the decision suggested that Swanston was starting to find less 
favour within Victoria.  
Further support for this notion is found in the treatment of the Swanston approach 
by the Court of Appeal in Vasiliou v Westpac Banking Corporation.67  Although the court 
ultimately concluded that it was bound by Swanston, it considered the criticism of the case 
and finally noted:  
It may be that the correctness of the Swanston Mortgage decision requires reconsideration. But, unless 
and until that decision is overruled after a full hearing before a bench of five appellate judges, we are 
bound by it.68 
This appears to be a concession that Swanston can and should be reconsidered in 
the appropriate circumstances.  The fairly clear implication is that even in Victoria there is a 
preference to adopt a broader approach, were it not for the precedent created by 
Swanston.  This judicial reservation is consistent with both earlier69 and ongoing academic 
criticism of the decision.70  In addition to recent unfavourable treatment by the Victorian 
courts, also of note is the treatment of Swanston in Victorian secondary sources.  Typically, 
                                                 
67 (2007) 19 VR 229.  
68 Ibid at [121]. 
69 David Wright, ‘Does the Registered Proprietor have a Caveatable Interest?’ (1995) 69 ALJ 935. 
70 In criticising Swanston, members of the judiciary have commonly cited the work of Meagher RP, Heydon JD 
and Leeming MJ, Meagher, Gummow and Lehane’s Equity: Doctrines and Remedies 4th ed, Butterworths, 
Leichhardt, 2002, at [4–170]. 
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the issue of whether a mortgagor can caveat the mortgagor’s own title is referred to as an 
area of conflicting authority.71 
Conclusion 
Both in terms of time and cost, there are significant advantages for a mortgagor in 
having the capacity to lodge a caveat where there may be serious impropriety by a 
mortgagee in exercising power of sale.  Provided a mortgagor is able to assert an interest 
beyond that of simply being the registered proprietor and has strong factual grounds to 
support the allegations of impropriety, the mortgagor’s caveatable interest in the 
mortgaged property should be recognised.  Unfortunately, until such time as the Swanston 
decision is formally overturned, there remains a significant disparity between traditional 
Victorian authorities and the more modern and broader approach on display in a number of 
other Australian jurisdictions.  While an appellate decision of the Victorian Court of Appeal 
such as Swanston must continue to command respect, the call for a uniform Australian 
approach to this issue seems apposite both in terms of precedent and practice for the 
reasons outlined in this article. 
In light of the significant consequences that may attach to serious impropriety in the 
mortgagee sale process, and with a view to adequately safeguarding a mortgagor’s 
equitable rights, it is to be hoped that the adoption of such a uniform approach may be 
imminent.  
                                                 
71 By way of example, the Victorian Conveyancing Practice Guide has been updated to note the criticism of 
Swanston by the South Australian Supreme Court in Stone, which suggests the ‘conflict’ is weakening in favour 
of the broader approach.  This conclusion seems irresistible given that the decision in Stone is not strictly 
binding in Victoria, certainly no more than critical cases from a number of other Australian jurisdictions which 
have taken similar steps to effectively overrule the effect of Swanston.  
